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sultation with specified departments and
representatives, to prepare and adopt a
program for telecommunications services
for disabled persons for motorist aid in the
event of a freeway emergency, to comply
with specified federal standards. [A. Trans]
SB 141 (Alquist), as amended March
17, would appropriate funds for the support
of the PUC in the 1994-95 fiscal year, in lieu
of funds appropriated by the Budget Act of
1994. This bill and several others are intended to force legislative discussion of the
possible consolidation of the California Energy Commission into the PUC or into a new
Department of Energy and Conservation, as
proposed by Governor Wilson in his January
5 "State of the State" address. [A. W&M]
AB 2333 (Morrow), as amended March
3, would require telephone, gas, and electric utilities to provide district attorney
inspectors and investigators with limited
customer information under specified
conditions with respect to investigations
relating to missing or abducted children.
The bill would require inspectors and investigators requesting this information to
prepare and sign a written affidavit supporting the request, and would provide
that specified persons and entities shall
not be subject to criminal or civil liability
for reasonably relying on an affidavit pursuant to this provision. [S. Inactive File]
AB 1879 (Peace). Existing law requires
the PUC to designate a baseline quantity of
electricity and gas necessary fora significant
portion of the reasonable energy needs of the
average residential customer. The PUC is
also required to establish a standard limited allowance of gas and electricity to
which specified residential customers are
entitled in addition to the baseline quantity. As amended April 21, this bill would
include, within those residential customers to which the additional limited allowance of gas and electricity applies, customers 62 years of age or older who reside
in extreme climatic zones, as defined. It
would also establish a different baseline
quantity of gas and electricity for those
customers. [S. E&PU]
SB 335 (Rosenthal), as amended May
10, is no longer relevant to the PUC.
AB 2363 (Moore). Existing law prohibits gas, heat, or electrical corporations
and their subsidiaries that are regulated as
public utilities by the PUC from conducting work for which a contractor's license
is required, except under specified conditions. As amended April 19, 1993, this bill
would also permit the work to be performed if the work is incidental to another
utility function and is performed by a utility employee who is present on the premises for the other function. [A. Inactive
File]
!22

AB 2028 (Bronshvag), as amended
April 13, 1993, would require the PUC to
implement the consensus recommendations contained in the report of the California Electromagnetic Field Consensus
Group dated March 20, 1992. [12:2&3
CRLR 260] [S. Appr]
AB 766 (Hauser), as amended April
21, would require the PUC to undertake a
propane safety inspection and enforcement
program for propane distribution systems to
ensure compliance with the federal pipeline
standards by propane operators within the
state, and permit the PUC to adopt rules, at
least as stringent as the federal law, in order
to protect the health and safety of customers
served by propane distribution systems. This
bill would require the State Board of Equalization and the PUC to establish a uniform
billing surcharge designed to cover the cost
of implementing these provisions. [S. Inactive File]
AB 173 (V. Brown), as amended August 30, 1993, would limit the amount of
salary paid to the President and each member of the PUC to an amount no greater
than the annual salary of members of the
legislature, excluding the Speaker of the
Assembly, President pro Tempore of the
Senate, Assembly majority and minority
floor leaders, and Senate majority and minority floor leaders. [S. Inactive File]
The following bills died in committee:
AB 683 (Moore), which would have required the PUC to reopen and reconsider
a specified decision relating to rates
charged retail electric customers for electricity from the Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Powerplant; SB 828 (Mello), which would
have required the PUC to adopt and implement regulations to assure that electrical
corporations meet specified requirements
in providing electric power to commercial
customers maintaining high technology
dependent operations; SB 1177 (Alquist),
which would have required the PUC to
review the federal Energy Policy Act of
1992 and to report to the legislature by
March 31, 1994, concerning the effects of
the Act on electric transmission services
in California; SB 1077 (Lewis), which
would have repealed various provisions
relating to the establishment of the rates
which are charged by common carriers;
and SB 1147 (Rosenthal), which would
have required the PUC to determine the
total statewide dollar amount of social
costs which are embedded in regulated
utility rates for delivered natural gas, and
spread that amount equally as a surcharge
to all consumers of natural gas in the state,
whether regulated or unregulated, utility
or nonutility.
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he State Bar of California was created
by legislative act in 1927 and codified
in the California Constitution at Article
VI, section 9. The State Bar was established as a public corporation within the
judicial branch of government, and membership is a requirement for all attorneys
practicing law in California. Today, the
State Bar has over 141,000 members,
which equals approximately 17% of the
nation's population of lawyers.
The State Bar Act, Business and Professions Code section 6000 et seq., designates a Board of Governors to run the State
Bar. The Board President is elected by the
Board of Governors at its June meeting
and serves a one-year term beginning in
September. Only governors who have
served on the Board for three years are
eligible to run for President.
The Board consists of 23 membersseventeen licensed attorneys and six nonlawyer public members. Of the attorneys,
sixteen of them-including the President-are elected to the Board by lawyers
in nine geographic districts. A representative of the California Young Lawyers Association (CYLA), appointed by that
organization's Board of Directors, also
sits on the Board. The six public members
are variously selected by the Governor,
Assembly Speaker, and Senate Rules
Committee, and confirmed by the state
Senate. Each Board member serves a
three-year term, except for the CYLA representative (who serves for one year) and
the Board President (who serves a fourth
year when elected to the presidency). The
terms are staggered to provide for the selection of five attorneys and two public
members each year.
The State Bar includes twenty standing
committees; fourteen special committees,
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addressing specific issues; sixteen sections covering fourteen substantive areas
of law; Bar service programs; and the
Conference of Delegates, which gives a
representative voice to 291 local, ethnic,
and specialty bar associations statewide.
The State Bar and its subdivisions perform a myriad of functions which fall into
six major categories: (1) testing State Bar
applicants and accrediting law schools;
(2) enforcing the State Bar Act and the
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct,
which are codified at section 6076 of the
Business and Professions Code, and promoting competence-based education; (3)
ensuring the delivery of and access to legal
services; (4) educating the public; (5) improving the administration of justice; and
(6) providing member services.
Almost 75% of the Bar's annual $56
million budget is spent on its new attorney
discipline system. The system includes the
first full-time professional court for attorney discipline in the nation and a large
staff of investigators and prosecutors. The
Bar recommends sanctions to the California Supreme Court, which makes final
discipline decisions. However, Business
and Professions Code section 6007 authorizes the Bar to place attorneys on involuntary inactive status if they pose a substantial threat of harm to clients or to the
public, among other reasons.

U

MAJOR PROJECTS
1993 Disciplinary Performance.
During the spring, the State Bar released
its 1993 annual report, which describes
major projects of the Bar during 1993 and
includes statistics on its discipline and
licensing programs.
The State Bar's discipline system underwent major overhaul during the late
1980s as a result of the passage of several
major reform bills-including SB 1498
(Presley) (Chapter 1159, Statutes of 1988),
which created the professional State Bar
Court-and the external pressure provided
by the independent State Bar Discipline
Monitor from 1987-1992. [11:4 CRLR 1;
8:4 CRLR 123-24; 7:3 CRLR ]]This year,
a blue-ribbon commission is undertaking
the first comprehensive review of the
Bar's new discipline system (see below);
in the meantime, the system's statistics are
indicative of its enhanced performance.
The Bar's Office of Intake/Legal Advice receives and processes complaints
against attorneys through the Bar's tollfree complaint hotline. During 1993, Intake fielded over 111,000 communications,
generating 20,625 "inquiries" (minor complaints) and 7,247 formal complaints. Intake
also received over 6,100 statutorily required reports about lawyer misconduct

from attorneys, banks, insurance companies, courts, and law enforcement agencies, and entered this information into the
Bar's computerized database. Astoundingly, the Bar received over 4,300 notices
from banks that attorneys were overdrawn
on their client trust accounts, which can be
an early sign of incompetent office management or embezzlement.
The Office of Investigations (01) is
responsible for formal investigations of
communications to the Bar which are classified as complaints. Under state law, the
Bar is supposed to complete investigations within six months of receipt of the
complaint, except cases which are designated as "complex," in which the Bar has
twelve months to complete the investigation. In 1993, according to the annual report, "the average time for processing investigations ...was 8.2 months." During
1993, 01 received 7,247 complaints containing 18,373 allegations against 7,791
attorneys; completed investigations involving 7,595 attorneys; and referred 155
matters involving 138 attorneys to law
enforcement agencies for possible criminal investigation. Once 01 completes an
investigation, it has several options. If 01
determines that the case should be forwarded to the Bar's Office of Trials for the
filing of formal charges, it prepares a
"statement of the case" (SOC) which summarizes the investigative findings. If 01
determines that no disciplinary violations
have been found or can be proven, it may
dismiss the case. For cases in between, 01
may issue a variety of lesser sanctions or
negotiate an "agreement in lieu of discipline" (ALD). In 1993, 01 prepared 1,200
SOCs; forwarded 1,473 matters to the Office of Trials; issued 407 letters of warning, 151 directional letters, and 30 admonitions; entered into 13 ALDs; and dismissed about 4,000 cases.
Based on OI's investigations, the Bar's
Office of Trials (OT) files formal charges
(a "notice to show cause" or NTSC)
against attorneys, prosecutes cases before
the State Bar Court, and is authorized to
enter into stipulations and ALDs and issue
warning letters. In 1993, OT filed 559
NTSCs and stipulations in original discipline cases in the State Bar Court; sought
immediate involuntary inactive enrollment ("interim suspension") of 20 attorneys who posed a continuing threat of
substantial harm to the public and 14 others for health-related disabilities; and handled more than 500 other matters such as
probation violations, moral character
hearings, Rule 955 violations, petitions
for reinstatement, and failures to comply
with conditions attached to public or private reprovals.
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Created in 1989, the State Bar Court is
the nation's first full-time independent
disciplinary court; the court consists of
seven hearing judges (any one of whom
may preside over a particular discipline
case) and a three-judge Review Department which issues the final agency decision in State Bar discipline cases. In 1993,
the State Bar Court disposed of 1,282 discipline and regulatory cases, an increase
of 201 over 1992 and 18% more than the
total number of cases filed during the same
period. These dispositions included 40 disbarments, 135 resignations with charges
pending, 68 public reprovals with conditions, and 112 private reprovals with conditions; the court placed a total of 40 attorneys on interim suspension (17 of which
were health-related).
The State Bar Court also publishes the
quarterly State Bar Court Reporter,which
contains decisions by the hearing judges
and the Review Department. 112:2&3
CRLR 268] According to the annual report, the widespread dissemination of
these cases "contributes significantly to
the parties' knowledge of pertinent State
Bar case law and the predictability of future results. This predictability, together
with the consistency of the proceedings
and satisfaction with Hearing Department
decisions, is reflected in the fact that review before the Review Department has
been sought in less than 11% of those
decisions."
Technically, a final disciplinary decision of the State Bar Court is only a recommendation to the California Supreme
Court, which has direct and original jurisdiction over State Bar Court cases by way
of a petition for review. Prior to the 1988
reforms to the State Bar Court, the Supreme Court was highly critical of the
Bar's disciplinary decisionmaking and reviewed every single discipline decision
(even in cases where no petition was
filed). Since the reforms and the restructuring of the State Bar Court, the Supreme
Court has approved the so-called "finality
rule," under which disciplined respondents must affirmatively petition the Supreme Court for review of a Bar disciplinary decision; if a respondent does not petition, the Bar's decision is final. Further,
the petition is discretionary, meaning that
the Supreme Court need not hear the appeal if the decision is proper; the Supreme
Court simply adopts the State Bar Court's
recommendation as its decision. [11:1 CRLR
148] In 1992-93, the Supreme Court did not
grant one petition for review in a Bar discipline case. Consequently, none of the
opinions issued by the Supreme Court in
1992-93 were attorney disciplinary matters, whereas 38.4% of the Court's 199022
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91 caseload was Bar discipline cases.
Thus, the improvements to the State Bar
Court have enabled the California Supreme Court to give significantly greater
attention to its civil and criminal caseload.
In 1993, the California Supreme Court
adopted State Bar Court decisions resulting in 67 disbarments, 105 resignations
with charges pending, 296 suspensions
(with actual time off), and 139 probation
actions.
Complainants' Grievance Panel Annual Report. In April, the Complainants'
Grievance Panel (CGP) issued its Sixth
Annual Report covering the period of January through December 1993. Created in
1986 in Business and Professions Code
section 6086.11, the CGP was established
to review-at the request of the complainant-complaints which have been dismissed by the Bar's discipline system at
an early stage, and report to the Board of
Governors and the legislature its findings
regarding the Bar's standards for investigation and closure of complaints. Thus,
the Panel serves two functions-it provides a last review of closed disciplinary
complaints, and it audits the performance
of the Bar's discipline system. Although it
appears to be an outside check on the Bar,
it is a Bar program housed within the
discipline system and financed by Bar
dues.
In 1993, the CGP reviewed 2,109 petitions, for a seven-year total of over 8,000
cases. It denied 1,420 petitions and ordered further investigation in 689 cases
(33%). CGP also audited 141 cases which
had been closed at various stages of the
process, and ordered further investigation
in 22 cases (16%). Based on these statistics, the CGP concluded for the seventh
year in a row that "there are too many
complaints being closed prematurely
and ...varying standards for closure are
used." To fulfill its statutory duty, the CGP
reiterated many of the recommendations it
made last year [13:4 CRLR 214-15] and
repeated its October 1993 challenge to the
Board's Discipline Committee and the
Bar's discipline system to reduce, by 50%,
the number of cases ordered returned for
the following reasons: (1) failure to provide complainants with a clear and accurate explanation of why their cases were
closed; (2) failure to identify potential ethical violations; (3) failure to corroborate
respondent replies or obtain complainants'
rebuttals or to seek out other relevant evidence from third-party sources; and (4) failure to employ appropriate informal disciplinary sanctions.
Discipline System Review Committee Update. During the spring, the "blueribbon" committee which is conducting a
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review of the Bar's four-year-old revamped
discipline system held several public hearings to receive comments from Bar staff,
licensees, and members of the public. The
committee is chaired by retired U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Arthur L.
Alarcon. [14:1 CRLR 175; 13:4 CRLR214]
At hearings on March 4 and March 16,
the committee heard from consumer
group representatives who testified that,
although the Bar has improved, its discipline system still fails to detect and sanction
many dishonest attorneys. At the same
hearings, lawyers who represent respondents in Bar discipline proceedings testified that the Office of the Chief Trial
Counsel is "over-prosecuting" attorneys
who have committed relatively minor violations due to a lack of prioritization
within the Office and external pressure
from the legislature and other sources
which causes the Bar to focus on hiking
up its discipline numbers rather than committing serious resources to serious cases.
Professor Robert C. Fellmeth, Director
of the Center for Public Interest Law and
former State Bar Discipline Monitor, presented a somewhat different perspective,
contending that the discipline system (1)
inadequately addresses an endemic problem of attorney dishonesty, and (2) does
not provide a reasonable assurance of
competence which is the raisond' etre of
most regulatory regimes. At the same
time, he conceded that one of the most
impractical ways to enhance honesty and
competence is through discipline enforcement-which he termed a "last resort" at
best. Professor Fellmeth discussed at
some length his view that people respond
erratically to a problematical sanction;
most people simply do not believe it will
apply to them, and deterrence has little
impact unless somehow imbued into a social structure. Rather, he advocated more
attention to prevention strategies, and to
changing the incentives at the "front end"
(licensing) rather than relying on the
"back end" (discipline).
Professor Fellmeth's unusual proposals included the following. First, he said
the Bar should create a system similar to
the British barrister model, with one
change-all counsel would be paid by the
court. He contended that a false myth about
the adversarial system ("truth emerges from
unfettered conflict") has created an ethic of
dishonesty, as many counsel lie by omission if not commission. His theory is that
attorneys will moderate dishonesty, concede more which should be conceded, and
truly be officers of the court (while representing clients with some vigor, but with
limits now lacking) if the court also pays
them.

Second, Professor Fellmeth said the
Bar could solve the incompetence problem by designing a regulatory system that
"relates" to it. He argued that a system
requiring a single examination taken at
age 25, followed by minimal tax-deductible continuing education courses with no
retesting, does not assure attorney competence over a fifty-year practice. Professor
Fellmeth was critical of the Bar for not
requiring malpractice insurance and then
not covering damages due to negligence
from its Client Security Fund-even as a
"payor of last resort" for gross negligence.
He also contended that the Bar rarely, if
ever, restricts a license or otherwise disciplines attorneys based on incompetence.
According to Professor Fellmeth, if the
purpose of Bar regulation is to prevent the
irreparable harm which can occur from
incompetence, then the Bar should license
by specialty (e.g., bankruptcy, patent, personal injury, or criminal defense) and retest every five years. The tests need not be
difficult, but would inhibit the incompetent "dabblers" in bankruptcy, criminal
defense, real estate, and patent law (which
some attorneys attempt).
Third, to compensate for somewhat
higher barriers to entry, Professor Fellmeth
advocated the authorization of regulated,
independent "legal technicians" licensed,
again, by specific subject areas (e.g., landlord-tenant, family law, consumer bankruptcy, or immigration), particularly in
areas where needed legal services are substantially unaffordable for most.
Professor Fellmeth acknowledged that
at the "back end," California has the most
advanced attorney discipline system in the
nation and disputed its allegedly "excessive" cost, noting that it cost less to create
than one-tenth the current average malpractice premiums per attorney-about
2.5 hours of billing at prevalent rates.
For his part, Judge Alarcon has raised
a number of possible recommendations,
ranging from a suggestion that State Bar
Court hearing judges refrain from writing
elaborate opinions in favor of quicker
decisionmaking, to a recommendation that
disciplined attorneys be required to fully
reimburse the Bar for its costs of investigation, to structural issues involving control of
the Office of Trial Counsel separate and
apart from the Board of Governors. However, Judge Alarcon and other committee
members cautioned witnesses and the press
not to assume that their questions, which
have been wide-ranging and often provocative, imply any point of view. At this writing,
the committee expects to release a report and
recommendations in late August.
Monetary Penalties for Disciplined
Attorneys. At this writing, the Board of
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Governors' Committee on Discipline and
Client Assistance is seeking public comments on its proposal to adopt Guidelines
for the Imposition of Monetary Sanctions
in Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings. Effective January 1, 1994, Business and Professions Code section 6086.13 authorizes
the imposition of monetary sanctions
against attorneys who are suspended or
disbarred or who resign from the State Bar
with disciplinary charges pending against
them; the statute provides that the fine
may not exceed $5,000 for each violation
found, up to a total of $50,000. Section
6086.13 also requires the Bar to adopt
rules setting forth guidelines for the imposition and collection of the monetary
sanctions.
The Guidelines establish two ranges of
fines for disciplinary violations of the
State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC). The upper range
($2,600-$5,000 per violation) is applicable to the most serious statutory or RPC
violations such as those involving moral
turpitude, acts of dishonesty, or intentional misappropriation or mishandling of
client funds. The lower range ($100$2,500 per violation) is applicable to all
other statutory or RPC violations. Under
the Guidelines, the specific sanction to be
imposed within the applicable range will
be determined by the State Bar Court
judge upon application of specified criteria, including whether the violation was
committed in the course of the practice of
law; the magnitude of the misconduct; the
length of time over which the misconduct
occurred; the nature and extent of the harm
caused; the extent of the member's prior
disciplinary record; and the extent to
which the member has mitigated the damage or harm caused. Relief from monetary
sanctions ordered by the Supreme Court
would be available only upon grounds of
financial hardship or that collection would
impair the collection of criminal penalties
or civil judgments arising out of the same
transactions. Monetary sanctions will be
paid into the Bar's Client Security Fund,
which assists in compensating clients who
have been victimized by the intentional
dishonesty of their lawyers. [13:4 CRLR
215; 8:4 CRLR 1]
At this writing, the comment period on
the proposed Guidelines closes on June 2.
Alternative Dispute Resolution Client-Attorney Mediation Program. Last
fall, Bar President Margaret Morrow appointed several members of the Board of
Governors to a new Client Relations Task
Force, whose purpose is to develop ways
to improve attorney-client communication and minimize misunderstandings
which lead to client dissatisfaction, com-

plaints to the Bar's disciplinary system,
and the poor public image of the legal
profession. [14:1 CRLR 175] One of the
major projects of the Task Force, which is
chaired by Board member Susan Troy, is
to guide the creation of the Bar's Alternative Dispute Resolution Client-Attorney
Mediation Program (ADRCAMP). This
project implements a provision of SB 645
(Presley) (Chapter 982, Statutes of 1993),
which added section 6086.14 to the Business and Professions Code; section 6086.14
authorizes the Bar to establish an alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) discipline mediation program to resolve "complaints against
attorneys which do not warrant the institution of formal investigation or prosecution."
[13:4 CRLR 216-17] The Bar's ADR program must identify sources of client dissatisfaction and provide a mediation process
to resolve those complaints or disputes,
unless the client objects to mediation. The
refusal of an attorney to participate in the
State Bar's ADR program, or the failure of
an attorney to comply with any agreement
reached in the Bar's ADR program, may
subject that attorney to discipline.
Preliminarily, the Task Force intends
to implement SB 645 through a pilot project in which six local bar associations will
conduct mediations of client-lawyer disputes under minimum standards adopted
by the Board of Governors; the local bars
may mediate disputes voluntarily brought
by either the lawyer or the client and matters referred to the local bar by the Chief
Trial Counsel.
In January, the Task Force-in conjunction with the Board's Committee on
Admissions and Competence and the
Committee on Discipline and Client Assistance-released proposed minimum
standards for the six participating local
bars for public comment. By the close of
the public comment period on May 5, the
Bar had received only one comment; the
Task Force subsequently modified the language of the minimum standards to incorporate this comment and feedback received from the six participating local bar
associations, and presented the standards
to the Board for approval at its May 14
meeting.
The standards, which were approved
by the Board on May 14, require the local
bars to adopt rules of procedure which
provide for (among other things) a fair,
speedy, and impartial mediation procedure;
adequate training for mediators, which includes classroom and practical training with
technical assistance provided by the State
Bar, the maintenance of specified statistics;
an appropriate procedure for parties to
challenge a mediator for cause; an appropriate procedure for a mediator to disclose any
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possible conflict of interest; a procedure
for preserving the confidentiality afforded
by Evidence Code section 1152.5 and
Business and Professions Code section
6086.1(b); a procedure which complies
with requirements developed by the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel for transmitting the results of mandatory mediation matters to that Office (see below); and
a procedure covering what action, if any,
will be taken in those instances where
information regarding lawyer misconduct
may be disclosed during a mediation. At
this writing, the Bar hopes that the six pilot
project bar associations-those in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Santa Clara, Ventura, Sacramento, and San Joaquin counties-will have their mediation centers in
operation by mid-summer.
Also at its May meeting, the Board of
Governors adopted emergency amendments to the Bar's Rules of Procedure
concerning ADRCAMP; these amendments include the rules under which the
Chief Trial Counsel will refer matters to
local bar associations for mediation.
Under the amendments, the Chief Trial
Counsel must consider the following factors in determining whether to require an
attorney to participate in ADRCAMP: the
attorney's prior discipline record; the existence of open inquiries or investigations
involving the same conduct; disciplinary
proceedings pending in the State Bar
Court; client willingness to participate in
the program; the availability of ADRCAMP in the county where the attorney
maintains his/her principal place of practice; and prior efforts to resolve the dispute. The amended rules also provide that
when mediation is concluded, the discipline matter will be considered closed subject to reopening if the client advises the
Chief Trial Counsel that the lawyer has
failed to comply with the terms of the
agreement. The Board adopted the emergency rule changes to facilitate the commencement of ADRCAMP.
California Legal Corps Rules. At its
January 21 meeting, the Board's Committee on Legal Services released for public
comment its proposed rules to govern the
California Legal Corps, a multifaceted umbrella organization whose purposes are to
enhance access to the legal system, encourage attorneys to provide legal services to
those in need, and provide funding and support for projects that employ unique and
creative ways to achieve these goals.
[13:2&3 CRLR 218-19] The rules provide for the creation of a Legal Corps
Commission to administer the rules and
all provisions of law regarding the CLC
and allocate CLC funds; the rules also set
forth the three components of the CLC:
225

REGULATORY AGENCY ACTION
- The "Fellows Corps" will include
new attorney fellows, summer law student
fellows, and others funded by grants from
the CLC. Funded in part by the CLC,
fellows will work at local bar associations,
legal services programs, and other nonprofit organizations devoted to projects
within the scope of the CLC.
- The "Volunteer Corps" will be volunteers who devote a significant amount of
time on pro bono efforts through existing
local programs and bar associations.
- The "Benefactor Corps" will be contributors who provide a significant level
of financial support for local legal services
programs or other efforts within the CLC's
mission.
The rules establish criteria for CLC
fellows who receive CLC funds; set forth
application procedures; establish a procedure whereby the CLC may apply for funding from unclaimed class action residuals
under SB 536 (Petris) (Chapter 863, Statutes of 1993) [13:4 CRLR 216-17]; set
forth rules governing the monitoring of
recipients of CLC funds and required reporting from recipients; and establish a
procedure for the receipt and handling of
complaints about CLC members or funding recipients.
The public comment period on these
proposed rules closed on April 22; at this
writing, Bar staff is analyzing the comments received and the Committee on
Legal Services is scheduled to review the
rules and the comments at its June meeting. These rules must be approved by both
the Board of Governors and the California
Supreme Court before they become effective.
Rules of Procedure for State Bar
Court Proceedings. In January, the Bar's
Executive Committee approved the release for public comment of its revised
Rules of Procedure for State Bar Court
Proceedings and Rules of Practice of the
State Bar Court. These revised rules would
replace the transitional and provisional rules
which were temporarily adopted when the
State Bar Court was created in 1989. The
draft rules are a culmination of a lengthy
process by an advisory committee chaired
by Review Department Judge Ronald W.
Stovitz; the advisory committee also included two State Bar Court hearing
judges, two attorneys from the Bar's Office of Trials, and two members of the Bar
in private practice who regularly represent
disciplinary respondents, moral character
applicants, and reinstatement petitioners
in State Bar Court proceedings.
By consensus of the advisory committee, the rules have been released for public
comment; however, some of the proposed
rules have already created controversy
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within the committee, including the following:
- Proposed Rule 23 provides that, upon
the motion of any party, the State Bar
Court may issue an order sealing a portion
of the record in a public proceeding if it is
established "that the compelling public
interest in the public nature of the proceeding is outweighed by a statutory privilege
or constitutionally protected interest of a
party, witness, or other interested person."
Although the rule also provides that relief
under the rule must be "narrowly tailored
to serve the specific interest sought to be
protected," the Office of the Chief Trial
Counsel has expressed concern that the
rule's application should be expressly limited to narrowly defined circumstances
"so as not to be used by defense counsel
to improperly shield a respondent's reputation."
- The proposed rules would authorize
the imposition of monetary sanctions for
discovery abuses in State Bar Court proceedings. However, both the Bar's Chief
Trial Counsel and the defense counsel representatives argue that the Court has not
been granted statutory authority to impose
fines for discovery abuses, and the Chief
Trial Counsel views the proposal as an
unnecessary and fertile area of expensive
litigation.
- The proposed rules grant the State
Bar Court the power to dismiss cases with
or without prejudice (which goes beyond
what is provided in the current transitional
rules), and permits dismissal with prejudice as a discovery sanction; the Chief
Trial Counsel opposes this change.
At this writing, the deadline for written
comments on the revised Rules of Procedure for State Bar Court Proceedings and
the Rules ofPractice of the State Bar Court
is June 14.
Other State Bar Rulemaking. The
following is a status update on other proposed regulatory amendments considered
by the State Bar in recent months and
described in detail in previous issues of
the Reporter
- Attorney Advertising. At its April 9
meeting, the Board of Governors amended
existing standard (5) and adopted five new
attorney advertising standards under Rule
of Professional Conduct 1-400. [14:1
CRLR 175-76; 13:4 CRLR 215; 13:2&3
CRLR 219]All of these regulatory changes
became effective on May 11.
Amended standard (5) prohibits mailers (except professional announcements)
that do not bear the word "advertisement"
or "newsletter" on the first page. New
standard (12) prohibits advertising (except professional announcements) which
does not state the name of the attorney

responsible for it. New standard (13) prohibits the use of dramatizations in advertising, unless it includes a disclaimer stating "this is a dramatization." New standard (14) prohibits attorney advertising of
"no fee" contingency arrangements unless
the ad also specifies whether a client is
liable for the attorney's expenses in handling a case. New standard (15) prohibits
advertising which states or implies that
legal services are available in a language
other than English unless the member can
actually provide legal services in such language or the ad states the employment title
of the person who speaks the language
other than English and discloses that such
person is not a State Bar member, if that is
the case. New standard (16) prohibits unsolicited advertising which sets forth a
specific fee or range of fees for a particular
service where, in fact, the member charges
a greater fee than advertised in such the ad
within a period of 90 days following dissemination of the ad, unless the ad specifies a shorter period of time regarding the
advertised fee; fees advertised in telephone directories must be adhered to for
one year.
- Gifts to Attorneys From Clients. At
its April 8 meeting, the Bar's Committee
on Admissions and Competence considered 28 public comments which had been
submitted on the December 10, 1993 version of proposed amendments to Rule of
Professional Conduct 4-400, regarding
gifts to attorneys from their clients. Following a public hearing and discussion,
the Committee further revised the language of the proposed amendments and
forwarded them to the Board of Governors
for consideration at its May meeting.
As revised, the rule states that "[a State
Bar] member shall not: (A) induce a client
to make any gift, including a testamentary
gift, to the member or to a person whom
the member knows is related to the member; or (B) prepare an instrument which
provides for any gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, to the member or
to a person whom the member knows is
related to the member, except where the
client is related to the member or transferee." The Discussion section to the revised rule states that a person "related to"
the member means the member's spouse
or predeceased spouse; relatives and
spouses of relatives within the third degree of the member, the member's spouse,
or predeceased spouse; cohabitants with
the member; partners or shareholders of
any partnership or corporation in which
any person described previously has a
10% or greater ownership interest, and
any employee of such person, partnership,
or corporation; and employees of the
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member. A client "related to" the member
means the member's spouse or predeceased spouse, relatives and spouses of
relatives within the third degree of the
member, the member's spouse or predeceased spouse; and cohabitants with the
member. A client "related to" the transferee means the transferee's spouse or predeceased spouse; relatives and spouses of
relatives within the third degree of the
transferee, the transferee's spouse or predeceased spouse; and cohabitants with the
transferee. [14:1 CRLR 176; 13:4 CRLR
217; 13:2&3 CRLR 220]
At its May 14 meeting, the Board of
Governors approved the proposed amendments. At this writing, the Bar's amendments have not yet been approved by the
California Supreme Court.
- Employment of Disbarred, Suspended,Resigned, or InvoluntarilyInactive Lawyers. Following discussion at its
April meeting, the Bar's Committee on
Discipline and Client Assistance revised
the language of proposed Rule 1-311, and
transferred the revised language to the
Committee on Admissions and Competence with a request that it be released for
public comment. [14:1 CRLR 176; 13:4
CRLR 216]
The revised language of the proposed
rule, which has engendered considerable
controversy, would prohibit a State Bar
member from employing or otherwise utilizing a disbarred, suspended, resigned, or
involuntarily inactive lawyer to perform
services on behalf of clients of the member
unless (1) the activities performed by such
lawyer do not constitute the practice of
law; (2) such lawyer has no direct contact
with the clients of the member; (3) such
lawyer does not receive, disburse, or otherwise have any involvement with client
trust funds or property; and (4) such lawyer does not negotiate with third parties on
behalf of the clients of the member. The
rule also requires State Bar members,
prior to employing or utilizing such a lawyer, to provide written notice to the State
Bar and to each client on whose behalf
such lawyer will work; the notice must
include a full description of such lawyer's
current Bar membership status and the
activities to be performed by such lawyer.
The member must obtain the client's dated
signature on the client's written notice,
and must retain a copy of the client's written notice for two years following termination of the member's employment with
the client.
The Committee on Admissions and
Competence considered the revised language and the Discipline Committee's request at its May 13 meeting, but declined
to release the language for additional pub-

lic comment until it has been further revised. At this writing, the Committee on
Admissions and Competence is scheduled
to revisit this matter at its June 17 meeting.
- Use of the Term "Certified Specialist." At its April meeting, the Board of
Governors approved the new version of
Rule of Professional Conduct 1-400(D)(6),
which prohibits a California attorney from
advertising as a "certified specialist" unless the attorney is certified by the Bar's
Board of Legal Specialization or by another entity approved by the Bar to designate specialists. 114:1 CRLR 176; 13:1
CRLR 142] At this writing, the new rule
has not yet been approved by the California Supreme Court.
- Discrimination in Management of a
Law Practice. On February 3, the California Supreme Court approved new Rule
2-400, which provides that "in the management or operation of a law practice a
[State Bar] member shall not unlawfully
discriminate or knowingly permit unlawful discrimination on the basis of race,
national origin, sex, sexual orientation,
religion, age or disability in: (1) hiring,
promoting, discharging or otherwise determining the conditions of employment
of any person; or (2) accepting or terminating representation of any client." 114:1
CRLR 176; 12:4 CRLR 235-36] The rule
took effect on March 1.
- Copies of Documents for Clients. In
September 1993, the Board of Governors
forwarded proposed new Rule of Professional Conduct 3-520, which would require attorneys to provide to a client, upon
request, one copy of any significant document or correspondence received or prepared by the attorney relating to the employment or representation, to the California Supreme Court for review and approval. [14:1 CRLR 176; 13:1 CRLR 142]
At this writing, the rule has not yet been
approved by the court.

*

LEGISLATION

AB 3659 (Horcher), as amended May
18, would delete an existing attorney advertising provision which prohibits the use
of an impersonation of any person directly
or implicitly purporting to be that of the
attorney or client featured in the advertisement, or a dramatization of events (unless
disclosure of the impersonation or dramatization is made in the advertisement), and
enact new regulations of attorney advertising in electronic media. Among other things,
it would prohibit an advertisement that contains any statement or claim relating to the
quality of the lawyer's legal services that is
not objectively verifiable.
The bill would also provide that an
advertisement may be communicated by
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electronic media only if it contains information permitted by this article, articulated only by the lawyer or an employee,
and with no other background sound. It
would also provide, in the case of television, that no visual display shall be allowed except those words in written form
as articulated by the lawyer or employee.
The bill would also require certain disclosures to be made in connection with advertising in electronic media. This bill is
sponsored by the California Trial Lawyers
Association and has sparked tremendous
controversy. Proponents of the bill assert
it is needed to prevent testimonials in
which ex-clients of the advertising attorney state that the attorney won them thousands of dollars despite being found at
fault or told by insurance companies that
their claim is frivolous. Opponents, led by
Jacoby & Meyers and Long Beach attorney Larry H. Parker, contend that further
restrictions on lawyers advertising will
hurt poor, minority, and elderly consumers
by reducing their access to information
about legal services and restricting competition. [A. Floor]
AB 2662 (Snyder). Existing law, with
certain exceptions, makes privileged any
confidential communication between a
client and lawyer, as specified. As amended
March 14, this bill would specifically provide that such information transmitted by
facsimile, cellular radio telephone, or
cordless telephone between the client and
lawyer is confidential. [S. Jud]
SB 1718 (Alquist). Existing law regulating admission to the practice of law
provides that, among other requirements,
a first-year law student attending a nonaccredited law school must pass an examination (known as the "baby bar") given by
the Committee of Bar Examiners, and
shall not receive credit for the first year of
study until he/she has passed the examination. A student also shall not receive credit
for any study subsequent to the first year
that is done prior to passing the examination, unless good cause exists for giving
credit for some or all of the study. As
amended April 27, this bill would eliminate the requirement that a student at a
nonaccredited law school pass the examination as a condition of receiving credit
for the first year of study or subsequent
study, and of admittance to the practice of
law; and instead require only that students
take the examination. This bill would further require the Committee to notify a
student who has taken the "baby bar" of
what his/her score suggests about the
student's probability of becoming an attorney. A student may continue his/her
legal studies as long as he/she can satisfy
the law school's academic standards. Both
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the Bar and former State Bar Discipline
Monitor Robert C. Fellmeth oppose this
bill. [S. Floor]
AB 2928 (W. Brown), as amended
March 2 1, would provide that any attorney
complained against shall receive any exculpatory evidence from the State Bar
after the initiation of a disciplinary proceeding in State Bar Court, and thereafter
when this evidence is discovered and
available. This provision would not require the disclosure of mitigating evidence. [S. Jud]
AB 3219 (Connolly). SB 645 (Presley) (Chapter 982, Statutes of 1993) authorizes the Board of Governors to formulate and adopt rules and regulations to establish, and standards and guidelines to implement, an Alternative Dispute Resolution
Discipline Mediation Program to resolve
specified complaints against attorneys (see
MAJOR PROJECTS). As amended May 12,
this bill would provide that those rules may
authorize discipline mediation to proceed
under discipline mediation programs
sponsored by local bar associations in California, and the rules shall authorize the
charging of reasonable administrative fees
for specified purposes. The bill also would
provide that the standards and guidelines
may encompass those sponsored programs.
Under existing law, an attorney who
contracts to represent a plaintiff on a contingency fee basis must, at the time the
contract is entered into, provide a duplicate copy of the contract, signed by both
the attorney and the plaintiff, or his/her
guardian or representative, to the plaintiff
or to the plaintiff's guardian or representative. This bill would substitute the term
"client" for the term "plaintiff."
Under existing law, an attorney who
contracts to represent a client on terms
other than a contingency fee basis, in
which it is reasonably foreseeable that
total expense to a client, including attorney fees, will exceed $1,000 is required to
use a written contract. This bill would
provide that at the time the contract is
entered into, the attorney shall provide a
duplicate copy of the contract signed by
both the attorney and the client to the
client. Under existing law, the contract is
required to include the hourly rate and
other standard rates, fees, and charges applicable to the case. This bill would instead require that the contract include any
basis of compensation including, but not
limited to, hourly rates, statutory fees or
flat fees, and other standard rates, fees,
and charges applicable to the case.
Under existing law, there is no requirement that upon the payment of $100 or
more in settlement of any third-party lia-

bility claim the insurer provide written
notice to the claimant. This bill would
require this written notice if the claimant
is a natural person and the payment is
delivered to the claimant's lawyer or other
representative by draft, check, or otherwise.
Under existing law, an applicant for
registration as a law corporation shall supply to the State Bar all necessary and pertinent documents and information requested by the State Bar concerning the
applicant's plan of operation. This bill
would provide that an applicant shall include with the application, for each shareholder of the corporation licensed in a
foreign country but not in this state or in
any other state, territory, or possession of
the United States, a certificate from the
authority in the foreign country currently
having final jurisdiction over the practice
of law verifying the shareholder's admission to practice and other specified information.
Under existing law, the Board of Governors is required to establish, maintain,
and administer a system and procedure for
the arbitration of disputes concerning fees,
costs, or both, charged for professional
services by members of the State Bar or
by members of the bar of other jurisdictions. This bill would enable the Board to
establish, maintain, and administer a system and procedure for mediation of these
disputes that would be voluntary for both
clients and attorneys, and would provide
that all discussions and offers of settlement of the mediation are confidential and
may not be disclosed in any subsequent
arbitration or other proceedings.
Under existing law, pursuant to rules
adopted by the Board of Govemors, an attorney is required to forward a written notice
to the client prior to or at the time of service
of summons or claim in an action against the
client for recovery of fees, costs, or both,
including a statement of the client's right to
arbitration. A client's right to arbitration is
waived by the client's proceeding with an
action or seeking affirmative relief. This
bill would provide that if the client waives
this right to arbitration, the parties may
stipulate to set aside the waiver and proceed with arbitration. [A. Floor]
AB 3302 (Speier). Under existing law,
the State Bar is required at the time of
issuance or renewal of a license to require
that any licensee provide its federal employer identification number if the licensee is a partnership or his/her social security number for all others. As amended
May 18, this bill would provide that a
licensing board may not process any application for an original license or for renewal of a license unless the applicant or

licensee provides its federal employer
identification number or social security
number where requested on the application. [A. W&M]
AB 3432 (O'Connell). Existing law
provides for the regulation of lobbying
activities of attorneys at the state level. As
amended April 26, this bill would specifically authorize a city, county, or city and
county to regulate lobbying activities of
attorneys, to the extent that those activities
occur within each jurisdiction. [S. Jud]
AB 1926 (Peace), as amended April 7,
would-among other things-provide that
conviction of certain insurance-related
crimes is conclusively presumed to meet
the requirements for a crime requiring
summary disbarment of attorneys. [S.
Jud]
AB 2911 (Goldsmith). Existing law
specifies that a party who is adjudged guilty
of contempt may be fined or imprisoned, or
both, as specified. As amended April 6, this
bill would provide that a party adjudged
guilty of contempt may, in addition, be
ordered to pay to the party initiating the
contempt proceeding his/her reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with the contempt proceeding.
Existing law specifically provides that
upon a first finding of contempt for failure
to comply with a family law order, the
court shall order the party to perform community service in lieu of imprisonment.
This bill would instead provide that the
court shall order the party either to perform community service or to serve a term
of imprisonment, as specified. [S. Jud]
The following is a status update on
bills reported in detail in CRLR Vol. 14,
No. 1 (Winter 1994) at pages 176-77:
AB 1287 (Moore), as amended January 27, would, until January 1, 1998, enact
a comprehensive scheme for the identification, study, and regulation of "nonlawyer providers" (also called "legal technicians" or "independent paralegals") under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Consumer Affairs. [14:1 CRLR 176-77] [S.
Jud]
AB 602 (Speier), as amended September 8, 1993, would authorize recovery of
attorneys' fees by a prevailing plaintiff in
an action to recover prescribed hospital,
medical, or disability benefits for a lifethreatening cancer condition; and make
unenforceable any contractual waiver of
the right to attorneys' fees under the bill.
[S. Inactive File]
AB 108 (Richter). Under existing law,
every pleading is required to be signed by
the party or his/her attorney. Existing law
authorizes every trial court to order a party,
the party's attorney, or both, to pay any
reasonable expenses, including attorneys'
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fees, incurred by another party as a result
of bad faith actions or tactics, as defined,
that are frivolous or solely intended to
cause unnecessary delay, as specified. As
amended June 22, 1993, this bill would
provide as a pilot project applicable only
in Butte, San Diego, San Bernardino, and
Riverside counties, until January 1, 1998,
unless that date is extended or deleted by
later enacted legislation, that, except as
specified, the signature of an attorney or
party on any pleading, motion, and any
other paper filed or served in a civil action,
constitutes a certificate that he/she has
read the paper, has made a reasonable
inquiry into the allegations, and presents
it in good faith and not for an improper
purpose. The bill would require any pleading, motion, or other paper that is not
signed to be stricken unless it is promptly
signed after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or moving party.
The bill would require an appropriate
sanction to be imposed by the court if a
paper is signed in violation of these requirements. The bill would also require
the Judicial Council to conduct a specified
study of the pilot project and report its
findings to the Legislature on or before
January 1, 1997. [S. Jud]
AB 335 (Ferguson). Existing law authorizes the State Bar to establish and administer a minimum continuing legal education program. Existing law also exempts from this program retired judges,
officers and elected officials of the State
of California, full-time law professors,
and full-time employees of the state of
California, as specified. As amended June
9, 1993, this bill would delete the exemptions for officers and elected officials of
the state of California. [S. Jud]
AB 2300 (Morrow). Existing law authorizes, and in certain cases requires, the
courts to submit civil matters for arbitration by retired judges or licensed attorneys.
Under these provisions of existing law, the
parties are entitled to a trial de novo after
arbitration, but, with certain exceptions, are
liable for specified costs of the arbitration
and prescribed expert witness fees, and may
not recover costs as a prevailing party, unless
the party obtaining the trial de novo obtains
a more favorable judgment, in either the
amount awarded or the type of relief granted,
than under the arbitration award. Under
existing law, in superior courts with ten or
more judges where the amount in controversy, in the opinion of the court, will not
exceed $50,000, the court is required to
submit the matter to this arbitration. Under
existing law, other superior courts may
provide for submittal of these cases to this
arbitration by local court rule where the
amount in controversy, in the opinion of

the court, will not exceed $50,000. Under
existing law, in superior courts with fewer
than ten judges and which have not
adopted such a local rule, matters are required to be submitted to this arbitration if
the plaintiff files an election therefor and
agrees that the arbitration award shall not
exceed $50,000. As amended June 9, 1993,
this bill would, until January 1, 1996, increase the above $50,000 maximums to
$100,000. [S. Jud]
SB 102 (Lockyer). Existing law, as
determined by the California Supreme
Court in Neary v. Regents of University of
California, 3 Cal. 4th 273, authorizes an
appellate court to reverse a trial court
judgment upon the stipulation of the parties. As amended May 13, this bill would
specify that an agreement or stipulation of
the parties may not be the basis for reversing or vacating a judgment duly entered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, except upon a showing of substantial legal
or factual justification. The bill would declare agreements to the contrary to be violative of prescribed public policy, except
upon a showing of substantial legal or
factual justification. [A. Jud]
The following bills died in committee:
AB 500 (Goldsmith), which would have
revised existing law which provides with
respect to the settlement of civil actions
that, if an offer made by a defendant is not
accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a
more favorable judgment, the plaintiff
shall not recover his/her costs and shall
pay the defendant's costs from the time of
the offer, to add reasonable attorneys' fees,
at the discretion of the court, from the time
of the offer to the costs recoverable under
this provision; and AB 2302 (Morrow),
which would have required mandatory
mediation in certain civil actions upon the
filing of a request for mediation by a party
against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed, within thirty days of
the latter filing.
*

LITIGATION
For the third year in a row, an independent arbitrator has ruled that the State Bar
is accurately calculating the proportion of
its activities which are "chargeable" to
compelled Bar licensing fees and those
which are "non-chargeable" under the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Keller
v. State Barof California.[13:2&3 CRLR
223-24; 12:2&3 CRLR 270] To implement the Keller decision, the Bar offers an
annual "Hudson deduction" reduction in
Bar dues to attorneys who are not willing
or able to pay for Bar activities which are
not germane to regulation of the legal profession or improvement of the quality of
legal services. Brosterhous, et aL v. State
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Bar of California, the Pacific Legal
Foundation's challenge to Bar's calculation of its "non-chargeable" expenses and
to the validity of the arbitration requirement, is still pending in the Third District
Court of Appeal. [13:2&3 CRLR 223-24;
12:4 CRLR 237]
The California Supreme Court recently agreed to review the First District
Court of Appeal's decision in Flatt v. Superior Court, No. S031687 (Apr. 21,
1994). In this case, plaintiff William L.
Daniel met with attorney Gail Flatt of
O'Brien, Watter, Davis & Piasta in July
1989 concerning a possible legal malpractice case against another attorney. Approximately one week later, Flatt realized that
her firm had represented the prospective
defendant attorney on another matter and
wrote a letter withdrawing as counsel due
to the conflict. But Flatt's letter did not
warn Daniel about an impending statute of
limitations bar to his malpractice action;
Daniel did not file within the period, and
he sued Flatt for professional negligence
in failing to warn him. Flatt contended that
no attorney-client relationship existed imposing such a duty, because it was refused
for legitimate reasons almost immediately
and before agreeing to handle the case.
In January 1993, the Sonoma County
Superior Court refused summary judgment
for the defendant; in March 1993, the First
District Court of Appeal summarily denied
a writ of mandamus. However, the California Supreme Court ordered the court of appeal to hear argument and write an opinion.
That opinion upheld the denial of summary
judgment by the superior court, citing Miller
v. Metzinger,91 Cal. App. 3d 31 (1979), for
the proposition that the initial contact between a client and an attorney, where legal
advice is sought, establishes a prima facie
attorney-client relationship. Justice Michael
Phelan dissented, arguing that while Flatt
incurred a duty of confidentiality toward
Daniel, no attorney-client relationship had
been formed. The Supreme Court accepted
review and vacated the First District's opinion; the case awaits final decision.
The Flattcase deals with an important
ethical problem facing licensed attorneys:
Does an initial inquiry by a possible client
concerning representation create the fiduciary and other duties of care normally present between an attorney and client? Is there
an interrelationship between the degree of
care required and the "acceptance of a case"
or other agreement to serve as counsel?
From the defendant's perspective, at issue is
when a duty to advise a consumer arises; if
it arises before the consumer is a client, what
does that portend in terms of initial contact?
Can an attorney, as a practical matter, refuse at least an initial inquiry and compe-
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tent advice as to any matter and any client?
Failure to inquire into possible causes of
action and periods of limitation may be
negligence. Further, what is Flatt to do
when her previous or present client is the
attorney Daniel wants to sue, and to whom
she owes an established duty-can she
ethically advise Daniel to sue her own
client, or assist in such a suit by advice on
the statute of limitations?
On January 13, the Supreme Court also
granted review on a case exploring the
underlying issue in Flatt-the statute of
limitations for legal malpractice actions.
In ITT Small Business Finance Corporation v. Niles, 24 Cal. App. 4th 719 (Oct.
21, 1993), the plaintiff alleged that the
attorney had prepared inadequate loan
documents. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant based on
a failure to file within the one-year statute
of limitations for professional negligence
by attorneys. But the Second District
Court of Appeal held that the action was
not barred because the statute was tolled
until "actual injury" had occurred, as provided for in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6(a)(1 ). The appellate court ruled
that actual injury did not occur until the
plaintiff was "forced to settle" a case challenging the sufficiency of the loan documentation arranged by the attorney. The
attorney argued that "actual injury" occurred when a case was filed alleging inadequate loan preparation (which had been
performed by counsel)-a filing more than
the one-year statute of limitations from the
malpractice filing against the attorney.
The Second District's decision appears to
be consistent with the recently-decided
Laird v. Blacker, 2 Cal. 4th 606 (1992),
which indicated that actual injury occurs
at the point the actions of an attorney lead
to an adverse judgment (precluding further delay into appeal).
This case deals with the tension between two policies: (I) the desire to require timely filing of cases to give parties
notice of the need to preserve evidence,
and to encourage adjudications close to
the time of the events to which they pertain; and (2) the policy discouraging the
filing of actions unless there are damages
requiring court intervention. As to this
latter concern, many acts of professional
negligence do not give rise to immediate
harm, but serve as a ticking time bomb
which might, or might not, explode. If
plaintiffs are barred based on a time certain from the act, then two problems occur
where the act is such a time bomb: Plaintiffs will file suit in many cases where
there is no harm in order to preserve their
rights in case harm should occur; and there
will be no remedy for time bomb-created
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damages-regardless of the degree of
error or devastating consequences. On the
other hand, as noted, many decisions of
counsel have impacts many years later,
and the allowance of suit without any time
limitation whatever, based merely on
damages occurring later creates a large
and undefined exception to statute of limitations policy.
In Ramirez v. Sturdevant, 21 Cal. App.
4th 904 (Jan. 12, 1994), the First District
Court of Appeal has ruled that a potential
conflict of interest between a client and
her attorney with regard to attorney fees
during settlement negotiations requires an
impartial review by the trial court of the
settlement agreement.
Patricia Ramirez was fired by her employer, and hired attorney James Sturdevant to represent her before the labor commission. Sturdevant obtained a favorable
ruling for Ramirez, but the employer refused to abide by the ruling, requiring
Ramirez to file a wrongful termination
action. After hiring and firing another lawyer to represent her, Ramirez returned to
Sturdevant, who drafted an attorney fee
agreement awarding him 33-1/3% before
trial and 40% after commencement of trial
of any amounts awarded Ramirez. The
agreement also provided for possible fees
from the defendant separate and apart from
the judgment obtained (i.e., "the basic fee
provision gave Sturdevant the discretion to
negotiate either alump-sum settlement, or
a bifurcated or trifurcated settlement, one
part of which would be his attomey fee").
The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the employer, and Ramirez
declined a postjudgment settlement offer
of $66,000 plus a waiver of costs, choosing instead to appeal.
Because he had begun to have doubts
about the strength of Ramirez' case and
believed that she had an inflated idea of
the value of her case, Sturdevant agreed to
represent her on appeal but only on three
conditions-one of which was that she must
agree to accept any settlement offer of at
least $150,000. The appellate court reversed
the summary judgment, and settlement negotiations began in earnest. Although all
prior settlement negotiations had contemplated a lump sum payment from which
Sturdevant would extract his contingency,
Sturdevant convinced the employer that
the better approach would be to negotiate
separate amounts for damages to Ramirez,
costs, and attorney fees paid directly to
Sturdevant. He eventually negotiated a
final figure of $400,000-$150,000 for
Ramirez, $35,000 for costs, and $215,000
for attorneys' fees. Ramirez was satisfied
with the gross amount of the settlement,
but maintained that Sturdevant's fees

should be limited to no more than 33-1/3%
of that amount. This litigation ensued.
Both the trial court and the First District agreed that "the record demonstrates
no breach of duty on the part of Sturdevant." However, in a case of first impression in California, the court noted that the
nature of the fee agreement created an
inherent conflict of interest for the attorney. Analogizing from federal class action
cases where counsel often negotiate settlements for a class and fees for themselves
simultaneously-and from the same fund,
the First District noted that courts often
insist on "settlement of the damage aspect
of the case separately from the award
of.. .fees." However, the court rejected a
"bright-line" approach which might invalidate prior or pending settlements, opting
for a "case-by-case approach" but holding
that the trial court is obligated to review
final awards in situations where an attorney negotiates his/her own award from the
same fund going to the client and determine whether counsel adequately "protected his client's interest" in such cases.
The First District remanded the matter to
the trial court for an evidentiary hearing
on the matter; on April 21, the California
Supreme Court denied Sturdevant's petition for review.
Ramirez serves as an example of the
dual regulatory scheme affecting attorneys. The court here enunciated a policy
within the possible province of State Bar
interest. It would appear that the Bar is not
precluded by this decision and related
cases from fashioning a bright-line regulatory rule to preclude such conflicts categorically. There are numerous options to
inhibit counsel from negotiating an award
for herself out of sums which would otherwise go to her client separate and apart
from apre-established amount or formula.
Thus far, however, the Bar has not done
SO.
On May 17, the Review Department of
the State Bar Court issued an opinion in
In the Matter of Respondent Q, No. 930-xxxxx. An attorney had filed a motion
for aprotective order to prevent the Office
of the Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC) (including the Bar's investigators) from contacting any of his clients who had not
specifically complained to the State Bar.
[Editor's Note: At one time, the State Bar
prohibited such contacts with "non-complaining" clients without a special probable cause showing before the Board's Discipline Committee, a majority of whose
members are licensed attorneys. [7:3 CRLR
1, 12] State Bar discipline reforms beginning in 1987 eliminated these limitations
on Bar investigators, which were criticized by the State Bar Discipline Monitor
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and others as not applicable to any other
professional regulatory regime in the state
and as overly solicitous to the profession.]
However, the Review Department held
that it lacks statutory or other jurisdiction
to rule on the practices of the OCTC;
applicable law gives it jurisdiction only
upon the filing of a NTSC or other pleading by the OCTC. The Review Department declined to analogize its powers to
equitable powers held by appellate courts
to grant writs to prevent various types of
executive abuse in the absence of an authorizing statutory provision or Supreme
Court order granting it such authority. The
State Bar Court does have some specific
authority under the State Bar Act to quash
subpoenas, including pre-filing subpoenas, but the court declined to expand that
power to intervene in the investigatory
interviews and other procedures of the Bar
not involving formal legal process. However, the Court noted that should the Bar
obtain evidence by "improper means," it
may be subject to a motion to exclude.

lions of dollars in client funds that lawyers
place in bank accounts annually. At the
same meeting, the Board voted to oppose
SB 1791 (Johannessen), which would divert TOLTA funds from legal services programs to government services such as probation officers and crime victim restitution programs; that bill later died in the
legislature.
*

FUTURE MEETINGS
June 17-18 in San Francisco.
July 22-23 in Los Angeles.
August 26-27 in San Francisco.
September 22-24 in Anaheim
(annual meeting).

*

RECENT MEETINGS
The January 21-22 meetings of the Bar's
committees and the Board of Governors
were cancelled due to the January 17 Northridge earthquake. Following the quake,
Law-Help-California, the State Bar's statewide disaster assistance program, coordinated efforts by local legal service providers and bar associations to provide direct
representation and long-term assistance to
quake victims. More than 700 attorneys
volunteered to staff tables at Disaster Application Centers and to answer hotline
phones, providing help with a variety of
legal problems brought about by the
quake, including landlord-tenant and insurance matters. In addition, the Bar sent
teams of investigators to local Red Cross
shelters to advise people of their legal
rights and warn them that lawyers who
solicit at such locations are violating state
law and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
At its April meeting, the Board of Governors approved the distribution of up to
$5.7 million derived from interest on lawyer trust accounts (also known as IOLTA
funds) to help fund legal services programs during 1994-95. This year's distribution is only 40% of the $15.2 million
distributed in 1993-94, and only 26% of
the $21.6 million distributed in 1990-91.
[10:2&3 CRLR 214] According to the Bar,
the huge decrease is due solely to declining interest rates on client trust accounts.
Judy Garlow, director of the Bar's Legal
Services Trust Fund Program, noted that
Bar staff is working to develop ways to
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